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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOLLERUI) V ~\N LINES, 
a corporation, and 
Lll~ERTY l\1UTUAL INSURANCE 
C()MPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, TYVEN ADAMS, 
\VASATCH CONSTRUCTION 
C()MPANY, and THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
10101 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT, STATE INSURANCE 
FUND OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
This brief is written in response to Plaintiff's 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN HARMONY 
''YITH ITS EARLIER DECISIONS. 
Plaintiff's Brief discusses at length the theory 
that the last employer is responsible for an aggrava-
tion of a previous existing condition. We do not dis-
pute this argument if there is under consideration 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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a matter involving "aggravation" as there are nu-
merous cases which so hold. However, it appears 
that the Plaintiffs in this case confuse the ag-
gravation of a pre-existing condition with a re-
occurrence of an injury. These two conditions are 
entirely different. The aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition assumes that there has been a fixed con-
dition and that thereafter a new injury occurs which 
adds to the disability which was then and there exist-
ing. In reoccurrence cases the condition is different. 
A reoccurrence involves a reoccurring or extension 
of the disability and difficulty which had its begin-
ning at the time of the original accident. 
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of the Petition for 
Rehearing (PB3) takes the position that the Court's 
decision in this case is in direct conflict with its 
earlier decisions on the question as to which employer 
is liable for the aggravation of a previous injury. 
\Ve submit that this is not a case of an aggravation 
of a pre-existing condition, but it is a case involving 
the reopening of a case by the Con1mission after 
there has been discovered a change in the condition 
of the injured workman. 
The jurisdiction and power of the Industrial 
Commission to make modifications or changes in 
its former orders is set forth in Section 35-1-78: 
"The powers and jurisdiction of the Com-
mission over each case shall be continuing, 
and it may from tin1e to time make such modi-
fications or changes with respect to its former 
findings, or orders with respect thereto, as 
in its opinion may be justified." 
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It is clear that the Con11nission in this case con-
sidered the condition of the claimant to be such that 
there \Vas a continuing process of deterioration mak-
ing it necessary to l'eopen the Mollerup case. Claims 
ha ,.P been reopened by the Commission on numerous 
occasions, and its decisions to do so has been sus-
tained by the Supreme Court. 
In Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 103 U. 371, 135 P. 2d. 266, the medical advisory 
board had 1nade a rating of 5 Cfo disability. The claim-
ant, Leonard Cook would not accept the rating, but 
at a later date did enter into a release with his 
etnployer and its insurance carrier upon the payment 
of compensation for 15 ~lo permanent partial dis-
ability. More than one year later, Cook filed a claim 
for additional compensation claiming to be totally 
disabled. Even though in this case there had been 
a release signed by the claimant, the Industrial Com-
mission held that the case could be reopened and 
the clain1ant was found to be totally disabled. This 
award was sustained by the Supreme Court. 
Although we mentioned this case in our earlier 
brief we feel that it is important to again discuss 
it in order to direct this Court's attention to its 
earlier decisions which affirm the right and the 
duty of the Industrial Comn1ission to reopen a claim 
and to grant additional compensation or benefits 
'vhen such seems to be necessary in order to accom-
plish the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has clearly 
emphasized this right and duty on the part of the 
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Commission when it said In the Barber case, at 
270 P.: 
"This Court has frequently held that a 
case may be reopened by the Commission if 
there has been a change of condition of the 
injured workman or if there has been some 
new development which shows the former 
award to be either inadequate or excessive. 
If an injured party fails to heal as had been 
expected at the time the award was made, 
such fact is a "new development" so as to give 
the Commission jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for additional compensation." 
Several cases are also cited which support the 
same doctrine. 
One of the earlier cases which discusses the 
effect to be given to the language of this section, 
which was then known as Section 3144 is Utah Apex 
Mining Company, et al. v. Industrial Commission, 
298 P. 381. The Court said at 382 P. the following: 
"If the Commission be required to deter-
mine the amount of compensation that shall 
be paid before the extent of the injury becomes 
certain and fixed, the employee may receive 
more or he may receive less than he is justly 
entitled to under the Industrial or Workmen's 
Compensation Act. It was evidently to lessen 
or avoid the probability of such injustice that 
the provision granting the Commission con-
tinuing jurisdiction was enacted. In this case 
Dr. Critchlow believed that Butler's condi-
tion would be improved if he would go to work. 
Butler was anxious to work rather than try 
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to eke out an existence on the a1nount of com-
pensation awarded to him. Under such cir-
cumstances we can conceive of no legal reason 
why he should be deprived of further compen-
sation in the event that after a fair trial he 
found that he was unable to work. Butler's 
application for additional compensation was 
in no sense the beginning of a new proceed-
ing, but was merely another step in the pro-
ceeding instituted by the filing of the original 
application. Chebot v. State Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, 106 Or. 660, 212 P. 792. 
The Commission had not made a final dispo-
sition of the cause, but on the contrary ex-
pressly retained jurisdiction thereof. This the 
Commission had the right and power to do 
under the law granting it continued jurisdic-
tion." 
This same section is discussed in Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission, 4 U. 2d. 185, 290 P. 2d. 692. 
In respect to Plaintiff's argun1ent that the doctrine 
of res judicata should apply in this case inasmuch 
as the applicant was awarded a 5ro disability settle-
ment soon after he was injured while he was work-
ing for Mollerup this Court said the following in the 
Spencer case: 
"We are not concerned here with the 
merits of the decisions just referred to but 
this much is unquestionably true : The' doc-
trine of res judicata as applicable to court 
procedure is not in a strict sense applicable 
t? proceedings before the Industrial Commis-
Sion. 
"It is not to be assumed from the above 
that an applicant can re-apply to the Commis-
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sion for a new determination upon the same 
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied 
with its former order, any more than it means 
that a defendant in such a proceeding could 
so do. The act provides that a party aggrieved 
by the action of the Commission may apply 
for a rehearing or seek a review in this court 
within times prescribed by law." 
The court went on further to say: 
"In view of the express terms of the stat-
ute hereinabove referred to, and the adjudi-
cated cases supporting the idea of continuing 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, 
there can be no doubt that once the applica-
tion has been filed, and the Commission's 
jurisdiction invoked, it has authority to en-
tertain further proceedings to deal with any 
substantial changes or unexpected develop-
ments that may arise as a result of the in-
jury." 
This court found against the claimant in the 
Spencer case because the testimony proffered was 
not sufficient to compel a finding that the old 1941 
injury was the cause of the disability Spencer 
claimed to be suffering in 1954, but the case does 
set forth the recent views of this Court as to the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commis-
sion to act under the authority of Section 35-1-78, 
U.C.A. 1953. It is our position that the Industrial 
Commission, in the case now before this court, had 
justification and authority under the said section 
to hold that Tyven Adams condition related back 
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to the industrial injury he received while working 
for Mollerup. 
The Commission after the hearing, at which 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman of the Medical 
Panel testified, entered its Order and in the Order 
stated that it accepted the testimony of Dr. Hol-
brook, and the finding of the Panel which was : 
" ( 1) This man's present condition repre-
sents a continuation of the injury of April 9, 
1958, and the subsequent minor accidents have 
not been significant in the overall progress of 
his condition since that injury." 
The Commission's Order was based upon ade-
quate, and competent testimony. 
POINT II. 
THE RULE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT 
APPLICABLE. 
\\"e have discussed this point in connection with 
our discussion of Point I, but we wish to make the 
following additional comments: 
This court, in rendering its decision in this case 
no\v under consideration, was fully aware of the 
arguments made by the Plaintiff's counel as to the 
nlle of res judicata and the inherent powers in the 
Industrial Commission by reason of Section 35-1-78, 
U.C.A., 1953, when it said in the main opinion: 
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"The ordinary rule of res judicata is not 
applicable to the instant proceeding. Inherent 
in the act is recognition that industrial 
injuries cannot always be diagnosed with 
absolute accuracy, nor their consequences pre-
dicted with complete certainty. Sections 35-
1-78, U.C.A., 1953 provides that "the powers 
and jurisdiction of the Commission over each 
case shall be continuing, and it may from 
time to time make such modification or change 
with respect to former findings, or others 
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be 
justified." Accordingly even though the Com-
mission has made an award, if there later 
develops some substantial change or new de-
velopment with respect to the injury than was 
known or was contemplated at the time of 
the original award, upon proper proceedings 
the Commission can make such adjustment 
as is just and reasonable and in conformity 
with the act.'' 
We therefore submit that this argument has 
been fully and carefully considered by this court. 
POINT III. 
ADAMS' PHYSICAL i\ILMENTS WERE 
NOT CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT WHICH OC-
CURRED WHILE HE WAS WORKING FOR 
WASATCH. 
May we again direct the Court's attention to 
the testimony which puts to rest the argument that 
there was anything of a substantial nature in the 
way of an injury which occurred while Tyven Adams 
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was working for Wasatch Construction Company. 
HP rnerely stepped off the tongue of the scraper 
which was about two or three feet high into some 
sand or dust. He did not fall, but remained stand-
ing. ( R-15). 
'Vhat occurred at that tin1e was certainly noth-
ing of great consequence. What happened was con-
sidered by the medical panel and the conclusion was 
reacherl that this minor event was not the cause of 
the clain1ant's difficulties. 
The fact that he experienced so1ne pain after 
stepping off the tongue was not unusual because 
Adams had been experiencing pain prior to the time 
that he went to work for Wasatch Construction Com-
pany. On October 15th he saw Dr. Eddington in 
Lehi and reported to the doctor that he was having 
considerable pain across the lower back and down 
his legs. The evidence of this is found in a letter 
written by the doctor to the Industrial Commission 
dated October 22, 1962 which was before the claimed 
''rasatch accident which occurred on October 27, 
1962. It should be observed that Dr. Eddington's 
letter written prior to the Wasatch Construction 
Con1pany accident suggested to the Industrial Com-
mission that his case be reopened. (R-11) 
This evidence clearly illustrates that the Plain-
tiff was experiencing a great deal of difficulty prior 
to the time he was employed by Wasatch. 
The Plaintiff testified that he had gone to see 
Dr. Eddington about his back prior to the time he 
went to work for Wasatch. (R-20). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
The incident which occurred while the Claim-
ant was working for Wasatch was aparently not 
serious and his condition had not changed much as 
he continued working for about a month thereafter 
and did not see a doctor until about December 6th. 
(R-41, 42). 
POINT IV. 
THE MAKOFF DECISION IS NOT IN CON-
FLICT. 
There is no conflict between the decision ren-
dered by this Court in the case now under considera-
tion and the Makoff decision, Makoff Company v. 
Industrial Comntission, 13 U. 2d. 23, 368 P. 2d. 70. 
In that case the Industrial Commission after con-
sidering the report of the Medical Advisory Board 
and the testimony of the Applicant which pointed 
to the fact that the Applicant had, while working 
for Makoff, sustained such an injury to his back in 
the 1957 accident that he was able to do only light 
work from that time on and found that the 1957 
industrial accident aggravated the previous condi-
tion. In the case now before this court the conclusion 
of the medical panel and the finding of the Commis-
sion was that it was the original accident which oc-
curred while the Applicant was working for Moiler-
up was the cause of the physical disability. The medi-
cal panel apparently concluded that this was not 
a case of aggravation, but was a case of a reoccur-
rence of the old injury, and that the incidents which 
occurred in between were incidental thereto and 
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were not the underlying reason for the Applicant's 
present condition. As it did in the Makoff case, the 
Industrial Cotnmission properly gave consideration 
to the finuings and report of the medical panel in 
reaching its conclusion. This was properly done and 
such procedure was contemplated by the enactment 
of the statute setting up the medical panel. 
POINT V. 
NOTHING NEW HAS BEEN PRESENTED 
BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The arguments presented by the Plaintiffs in 
their Brief in support of their Petition for Rehearing 
are the san1e as were presented by the Plaintiffs in 
their original brief. Nothing new has been presented 
by the Plaintiffs in the Petition for Rehearing. All 
matters discussed in their Brief were considered by 
this Court. In addition thereto the same matters 
\vere presented to the Court by oral argument, so it 
cannot be said that the court did not, at the time 
this decision was rendered, consider the points now 
made by the Plaintiffs. 
In the old case entitled In Re: Proceedings to 
Disbat, JlacKnight, Attorney, 4 U. 237, 9 Pac. 573 
this Court stated : 
"We have many times held that, to justi-
fy a rehearing, a strong case must be made. 
'Ve must be convinced, either that the Court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case or that it erred in its conclusions, or that 
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some matter has been discovered which was 
unknown when the case was argued." 
The record is clear and complete in this case 
and none of the elements are present as set forth 
above, which would compel the court to grant a re-
hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we urge this Court to deny the 
Petition for Rehearing as we feel that all matters 
presented have heretofore been fully considered by 
the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
Attorney for Wasatch 
Construction Company, 
and the State Insurance 
Fund 
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